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The Demand for Enhanced Annuities
Petra Schumacher∗
Abstract
In enhanced annuities, the annuity payment depends on one’s state of
health at some contracted date while in ”standard annuities”, it does not.
The focus of this paper is on an annuity market where ”standard” and en-
hanced annuities are offered simultaneously. When all insured know equally
well on their future health status either enhanced annuities drive standard
annuities out of the market or vice versa. Both annuity types can exist si-
multaneously when the insured know varying exactly on their risk type. In
the case of the existence of such an ”interior” solution, its is derived that this
solution must be unique in the case of risk averse insured and that it Pareto-
dominates the corner solution. Finally, it is shown that in all cases where
at least part of the insured buy enhanced annuities social welfare is reduced.
JEL-Classification: D14, D61, G11, G23
1 Introduction
Annuitizing a part of wealth in order to secure a constant consumption level1 over
the whole lifetime seems like a reasonable thing to do for a risk-averse individual.
In particularly, annuities include protection against the loguevity risk, i.e. the
risk of outliving the financial assets of an individual. This risks is not covered by
any other financial investment possibilities. Yet, the theoretical results on a func-
tioning annuity market (i.e. the advantageousness of annuities over conventional
bonds, see Yaari (1965), Brown et al. (2005)) significantly differ from empirical
∗Institute for Risk and Insurance Management, Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich, E-
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1This result holds true when the subjective discount is equal the interest rate.
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evidence of annuity demand (see e.g. Mitchell et al. (1999) and Dushi/Webb
(2004)). Many different explanations have been provided in order to solve the so-
called ”annuity puzzle”. Brown (2001) identifies money’s worth2, adverse selection,
bequest-motives3, financial inflexibility of annuities to secure against unsecure fu-
ture expenses4 and the fact that risk sharing might also be possible within families5
as the most meaningful approaches to the annuity puzzle. However, a concluding
clarification on the relevance of the different approaches has not been provided
yet.
Concerning adverse selection, it is often argued that a potential insured has su-
perior knowledge of his/her life expectancy compared to the insurance company
at the conclusion of an annuity contract. As Akerlof (1970) shows, adverse selec-
tion can lead to a complete market failure. Rothschild/Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson
(1977) examine the impact of adverse selection on insurance markets and dis-
cussed potential equilibria. Doherty/Thistle (1996) show that superior knowledge
can have positive private value even though the social value is negative. Hence,
individuals might be willing to acquire and use private information even though
the overall social effects might be non- desirable.
Adverse selection on annuity markets has repeatedly been in the focus of many pa-
pers. Finkelstein/Poterba (2004) find empirical confirmation that adverse selection
plays an important role in the annuity market and Brown/Orszag (2006) outline
that the mortality rates of annuitants in different annuity markets differ from the
overall mortality rates. Palmon/Spivak (2007) measure the social effects of adverse
selection in the annuity market by using numerical analysis. Eichenbaum/Peled
(1987) show that in annuities markets that suffer from adverse selection, some
individuals will choose to accumulate capital privately even though annuities offer
higher return rates.
Enhanced (or impaired) annuities were designed to address the problem of adverse
selection in the annuity market. In a standard annuity, the annual payment does
not depend on the state of health of the potential insured while in enhanced annu-
2See Mitchell et al. and James/Song (2001).
3See Abel/Warshawsky (1988) and Friedman/Warshawsky (1990).
4See Strawczynski (1999).
5See Kotlikoff/Spivak (1981) and Brown/Poterba (1999).
2
ities it does depend on the health status. There are different designs of enhanced
annuities possible. For example, they can be conditioned on the health status at
the contract conclusion or at the retirement commencement or at any other point
of time.
Enhanced annuities are hence particularly attractive to persons with impaired
health when they are contracted before the health status becomes observable to
the insurance company. Being a low risk in the annuity market implies having
a shorter life expectancy than other individuals. Therefore, risk classification is
done by allowing a higher pension payment for characteristis of an individual that
normally shorten the life expectancy. Yet, these factors usually also include things
which are difficult to verify. One example is smoking. Since smoking significantly
reduces life expectancy it would make sense to give smokers a higher annuity pay-
ment if all other are things equal. But it is difficult to consider smoking for pricing,
since it is mutable (for a detailed analysis of the implications of mutable risk clas-
sification characteristics, see Bond/Crocker (1991)) and hard to verify.
The focus of this paper is on deferred annuities where the contract inception pre-
cedes the retirement entry age. This implies that the annuitization is not fixed
when the contract is signed but depends on the health state at the entry age.
This assumes that the insurance companies will do a more precise analysis of one’s
health at the retirement date. The superior knowledge of the potential insured
diminishes at this point.
Most of the existing literature on enhanced annuities employs an actuarial science
approach. Weinert (2006), e.g, discusses underwriting approaches to enhanced an-
nuities while Ainslie (2000) analyzes the potential market for enhanced annuities
and covers different actuarial aspects such as reserving, modelling mortality and
other pricing features. Richards/Jones (2004) focus on the impact of mortality
changes on enhanced annuities.
Recently though, Hoermann/Russ (2007) examined the potential economic rele-
vance of enhanced annuities in an insurance market using Monte-Carlo simulations.
They find that those companies who do not offer enhanced but offer standard an-
nuities will end up with group of insured with a higher life expectnacy on average.
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Thus, they their profit will be reduced or they need to charge higher prices.
In the model introduced in this paper, results are derived for markets where en-
hanced and standard annuities are offered simultaneously. It expands the infor-
mational setting of Hoermann/Russ (2007) by allowing different forms of superior
knowledge of the insured and adds an analytical approach to the numerical work
of Hoermann/Russ(2007).
This approach distinguishes between the case where all insured have the same
knowledge on their health status,6 i.e. they have homogenous knowledge, and the
case, where some insured know more than others, i.e. heterogenous knowledge.
When all insured know equally well on their future health status either enhanced
annuities drive standard annuities out of the market or vice versa. Both annuity
types can exist simultaneously in the case of heterogeneous knowledge. In the
case of the existence of such an ”interior” solution, its is derived that this solution
must be unique in the case of risk averse insured and that it Pareto-dominates the
corner solution. Finally, it is shown that in all cases where at least part of the
insured buy enhanced annuities social welfare is reduced.
After this short introduction the remaining paper is structured as follows. In sec-
tion two the model background is illustrated. The implications of homogeneous
superior knowledge are presented in section three while, in section four, heteroge-
neous superior knowledge is introduced. Finally, section five contains some con-
cluding remarks.
2 Model Background
So far, there is not a capacious amount of economic literature on enhanced annu-
ities. Most of the existing literature on enhanced annuities employs an actuarial
science approach. Weinert (2006), e.g., gives a market survey and discusses under-
writing approaches to enhanced annuities while Ainslie (2000) analyzes the poten-
tial market for enhanced annuities and covers different actuarial aspects such as
reserving, modelling mortality and other pricing features. Richards/Jones (2004)
6This assumption does not imply that all insured are the same risk. They only know the
same on how their risk type will develop.
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focus on the impact of mortality changes on enhanced annuities.
Recently though, Hoermann/Russ (2008) first examine the economic relevance of
enhanced annuities in an insurance market using Monte-Carlo simulations. In their
model, the insured have perfect knowledge regarding their life expectancy and will
choose a different insurer if the premium difference exceeds a certain threshold.
They find that those companies who do not offer enhanced but standard annuities
suffer from adverse selection. The model introduced in this paper expands the
informational setting of Hoermann/Russ (2008) by allowing different forms of su-
perior knowledge of the insured and adds an analytical approach to the numerical
work of Hoermann/Russ (2008).
In this paper, a market is analyzed where standard and enhanced annuities are of-
fered simultanously. A standard annuity does not contract upon the health status
of a potential insured while enhanced annuities do so. This adresses the problem
that the health status of the insured influences the mortality rate and, thus, de-
termines the advantageousness of an annuity contract with a fixed premium and
a fixed payment for the insured. Hence, if the insured has superior knowledge
regarding his/her life expectancy, adverse selection threatens. Low risks could be
driven out of the market. Yet, if enhanced annuities can take all factors correlated
with one’s life expectancy into account, adverse selection problems are eliminated.
In the approach presented here, the focus is on deferred annuities. Thus, the
retirement payments begin considerably later than the contract inception. It is
assumed that the insurance companies could do a more precise underwriting at the
retirement commencement than at the contract conclusion and that informational
asymmetries might diminish between those two points of time as argued in the
introduction.
In my model, it is supposed that there is a homogenous risk group willing to buy
an annuity by paying a lump-sum P in t0. The annuity payment begins at date
t1, i.e. a deferred annuity is contracted. Due to some factors like life style and
genetic disposition, the homogenous risk group divides into two groups between t0
and t1: One with a high frailty rate and one with a low frailty rate which directly
affects the survival probabilities within each risk group. As illustrated in figure 1,
the probability of becoming a high risk in t1 is 1− η where 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 and, hence,
the probability of becoming a low risk is η.
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Figure 1: Development of risks
The annuity buyers can choose in t0 whether they buy a standard annuity with an
annual payment of b or an enhanced annuity where the annual payment depends
on the health status in t1. Hence, having chosen the enhanced annuity, the insured
either receive a payment of bL if they turn out to be a low risk or bH if they are a
high risk in t1. Corrspondingly, it holds that b
H ≤ b ≤ bL.
The assumption that all individuals invest a fixed lump-sum P in annuity insur-
ance reagardless of the annuity product chosen might be quite restrictive. An
individual faces a higher income risk during retirement if he/she purchases an
enhanced annuity since the payouts depend on the realisation of the risk type.
Thus, one can argue that individuals that decide for enhanced annuities and face
uncertainty on their risk type will rather invest more or accumulate some capital
privately to cover the additonal risk. Correspondingly, it would be sensible to
allow a modelling of the annuity demand depending on the income and income
risk before and after retirement. However, it is empirically shown e.g. by Skinner
(1988) that the capital saved for retirement was not dependent on the riskiness
of the income. Thus, the simplifications of a fixed investment in annuities can be
motivated by this empirical fact.
Assumptions about how individuals value the utility of future annuity payments
have to be made. Folllowing Yaari, an intertemporally separable utility function
for the vector b of payment flow v(b) is assumed such that u(b) denotes the utility
function of the annual payment of b at any point of time. Suppose that the agent
is risk-averse and hence, we have u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0. In addition, it is assumed
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that an individual will decide for the annuity product that offers the higher ex-
pected utility to him/her. Concerning the market on which annuities are sold, it
is assumed that there is perfect competition. Thus, insurance companies will not
make any profits but offer insurance at fair prices.
3 Homogeneous Knowledge of the Insured
In this section, it is assumed that all insured have the same knowledge on their
life expectancy. This does not mean that all insured have the same risk type, it
is simply assumed that there are not any insured that know better than others.
There are only two possible types of this homogeneous knowledge: Either all
insured know only the proportion of high and low risks in t0 and, thus, they have
identical knowledge as the insurance companies. The alternative is that all insured
are already informed in t0 about which risk type they will be in t1, i.e. they have
superior knowledge compared to the insurance company.7
If the insured have no superior knowledge, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 1 If risk-averse individuals have no further information on their risk
status in t1 except than the general probability of becoming a high or a low risk,
they will prefer the standard annuity to the enhanced annuity.
Proof:
This holds true because the standard annuity and the enhanced annuity have the
same expected payment. Yet, if an insured choose the enhanced annuity, he/she
also bears the risk of either becoming a high or low risk which is covered by the
standard annuity. Thus, a risk-averse individual prefers a standard annuity.
This result is similiar to the results of Bruigivani (1993) and Shesinski (2007).
Bruigivani shows that individuals should always contract annuities immediately
before their own knowledge of their risk status increases. Shesinski models the de-
mand for annuities in dependance of the life income and retirement age. He shows
7Because of the constraint that η is the proportion of low risks in t0 there are no other
possibilities where the knowledge of the insured is homogeneous.
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as well that uniformed insured should refrain from signing an annuity where the
future payments depend on their health status and prefer an uniform annuity for
all risk types with a fixed retriement entry age.
The proposition shows that, ex-ante, the standard annuity is beneficiary for an
uninformed, risk-averse insured. The insurance companies cannot offer an en-
hanced annuity with higher expected utility as, by assumption, all insured invest
P . Therefrom, insurance companies can only attract customers by increasing the
payouts. As payouts can only be increased for one risk type by decreasing the
payouts for the other risk types - otherwise the insurance company will default -
such a contract will not attract both risk types and, thus, make negative profits.
The insurance companies cannot as well offer more beneficiary standard annuity
as only a standard annuity with higher payouts can attract customers. Such a
contract cannot create non-negative profit. Therefore, the standard annuity must
be an Nash-equilibrium in the Rothschild/Stiglitz-sense ex-ante.
Yet, it has to be examined whether this situation will also be an equilibrium ex-
post. Ex-post, when the risk type is revealed, offering an enhanced annuity then
and letting the insured contract out by disbursing P , all low risks would contract
out and choose the enhanced annuity now. Hence, the standard annuity providers
must reduce payout for the standard annuity from b to bH , if the standard annuity
provider cannot prevent the contracting out. In that case, the standard annuity
does not differ anymore from the enhanced annuity. A prevention against this
ex-post contracting out can be achived by reducing the disbursement sufficiently.
If instead it is assumed that the insured already know their future risk status, then
it holds that:
Proposition 2 If the potential insured have perfect knowledge on their future risk
status, all individuals will receive annuity insurance according to their risk status
in t1.
Proof:
In t0, the low risk can either choose the standard annuity with certain annual
payment of b or the enhanced annuity with the payment of bL which is certain
in that case as well. Since b ≤ bL holds, the low risk type will always decide to
purchase the enhanced annuity. High risks will prefer the standard annuity and,
thus, they can be identified because of buying the standard annuity. Therefore,
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the standard annuity will be priced accordingly and a seperating equilibrium will
be implemented.8
As a part of the first best optimum, all insured receive a contract according to
their risk type. A self-selection contract which is traditionally offered in situation
with asymmetric information is strictly dominated by this solution since high risks
are offered the same contract as in a self-selection design but low risks are better
off. This welfare gain compared to the traditional asymmetric information situ-
ation occurs due to fact that the offered contract incorporates the elimination of
asymmetric information in t1.
4 Heterogeneous Knowledge of the Insured
Both cases of section 3 (the insured have either perfect knowledge regarding their
life epectancy in t0 or no superior knowledge compared to the insurance companies
in t0 at all) might not apply to all potential insured. It might be more realistic
to expect some people to know perfectly while others only have a vague idea of
how their life expectancy will develop. In terms of the smoking and unhealthy
nutrition example an individual that smokes and eats in an unhealthy way might
be quite sure that he/she will turn out to have a short life expectancy and, thus,
be a low risk. Meanwhile someone who has developed ”average” healthy habits
might face a higher insecurity about his/her future risk type due to e.g. genetic
disposition.
In this spirit, a signal is introduced to model heterogeneous superior knowledge.
It is assumed that all potential insured receive a signal z in t0 that is a realisation
of the random variable Z. Z is continuously distributed on [0, 1] with probability
density function g(z) such that
E(Z|z < z∗) = c · z∗ ∀z∗ ∈ [0, 1]. (1)
8If annuities are only offered at a fixed premium P this seperating equlibrium will always be a
Nash-Equilibrium in the Rothschild/Stiglitz-sense because a pooling contract (standard annuity)
will contain a lower annual payment b if η < 1.
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This means that the expected value conditioned on z < z∗ is some linear function
of z∗ as for uniform(0,1)-distributions. However, other probability density function
are possible with this property.
A signal z = 1 implies that an individual will be a low risk in t1 with certainty
while z = 0 connotes that the individual will certainly be a high risk. Furthermore,
it is assumed that E(Z) =
∫
z · g(z)dz = η. As it holds by (1) that
E(Z) = E(Z|z < 1) = c · 1 = c
it can be followed that c = η.
It is assumed that all values of z ∈ (0, 1) can be interpreted as the probability of
becoming a low risk. The heterogenous superior knowledge of the potential insured
is hence modelled in such a way, that the individuals who receive a signal z close
to 0 or close to 1 have significantly more knowledge than the insurance company
because they know quite exactly about their future risk type. Meanwhile those
individuals who received a signal close to η only have some knowledge on their
furture risk type which is comparable to the knowledge of the insurance company.9
The individuals are now facing a different decision problem than in section 3 since
they will take the additional information into account for their decision in t0. The
standard annuity has the expected utility of
v(b) =
ω−x∑
k=0
α(k) · u(b) · kpx = u(b) · e (2)
with e =
ω−x∑
k=0
α(k) · kpx and
the following denotations: ω is the maximum age, x is the pension entry age, α(k)
is a subjective discount factor in the kth period and kpx is the survival probability.
e is a factor that includes the sum of the subjective discount rate times the survival
probabilties. (2) implies that v(b) is an increasing and concave function.
The model assumes that b and e are dependent of the risk group buying the
standard annuity and that both will adapt immediately to changes in the risk
9It is assumed that the insurance companies know about the average proportion of high and
low risks in t0.
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group. Thus, it is supposed that insurance companies will anticipate which risks
they will attract with a standard annuity at a certain price.
For an individual with the signal z, the enhanced annuity yields the expected
utility of
z · v(bL) + (1− z) · v(bH) = z · u(bL)eL + (1− z) · u(bH)eH (3)
where eL is the subjectively discounted life expectancy for the low risks and eH
for the high risks, respectively.
By assumption, every individual compares the expected utility of the standard
annuity and the enhanced annuity in t1. For a consideration of a market equilib-
rium, the cutoff individual, i.e. the individual that has received the cut-off signal
z∗ and is indifferent between both annuity types, has to be examined. This implies
that all individuals having received a signal z > z∗ will choose the enhanced an-
nuity and all individuals having received a signal z < z∗ will choose the standard
annuity (For a graphical illustration, please refer to figure 2). Prerequisite is the
assumption that u(bH) · eH ≤ u(bL) · eL with bH ≤ bL and bH · eH = bL · eL. This
assumption implies that an individual will rather be a low risk and receive higher
annuity payouts.
Under these assumption, the following necessary condition must be fullfilled in an
equilibrium:
u(
aligned payment of standard annuity︷ ︸︸ ︷
η · z∗ · bL + (1− η · z∗) · bH ) ·
aligned factor e︷ ︸︸ ︷
(z∗ · eL + (1− z∗) · eH) = (4)
z∗ · u(bL) · eL + (1− z∗) · u(bH) · eH︸ ︷︷ ︸
utility of enhanced annuity
where η · z∗ is - as defined in section 2 - the expected probability of becoming
a low risk among the standard annuity buyers. Because of the alignment of the
standard annuity, e and b depend on η · z∗. (4) is a necessary conditon as in an
equilibrium none should be in the position to increase his or her expected utility
by changing the contract. All individuals having received a lower signal than z∗
are more likley to become a high risk and, thus, gain more expected utility from
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Figure 2: The cutoff signal z∗
the standard annuity. Those with an signal greater than z∗ are ”better” risks and
they will choose the enhanced annuity. Only, the cut-off individual is indifferent
between both annuities. Hence, nobody will be induced to substitute his or her
product. In this setting, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 3 z∗ = 0 solves the equilibrium equation.
Proof: Inserting z∗ = 0 in (4) and using the assumption on the conditional expec-
tation of Z yields
u(η · 0 · bL + (1− η · 0)bH) · (0 · eL + (1− 0) · eH) =
0 · u(bL) · eL + (1− 0) · u(bH) · eH ⇔ u(bH) · eH = u(bH) · eH
which proves the proposition.
At this potential equilibrium with z∗ = 0, only an individual that will certainly
turn out to be a high risk is indifferent between the standard and the enhanced
annuity. Thus, the standard annuity will be priced accordingly. Therefrom, the
pension payment of the standard annuity will be equal to the the payment for the
high risk that choose the enhanced annuity, i.e. b = bH . Altogether, one could
argue that in this case the standard annuity is driven out of the market and only
enhanced annuities are still offered. Hence, insurance against becoming a high or
a low risk in t1 is not available anymore since this protection is only included in
standard annuities.
For the further analysis the following Lemma is required:
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Lemma 1 z = 1 is cannot be an equilibrium.
Proof: This can be seen by inserting z = 1 in (4).
u(η ·1bL+(1−η ·1)bH)·(1·eL+(1−1)·eH) = u(η ·1bL+(1−η ·1)bH)·eL < u(bL)·eL.
Correspondingly, it can be ruled out that only the standard annuity will be bought
and enhanced annuities will not have any purchasers. In the following, possible
interior solutions are examined. At an interior solution, part of the insured prefer
the standard annuity while others purchase the enhanced annuity. As said before,
the cutoff individual must be indifferent between the standard annuity and the
enhanced annuity and, thus, value the protection against becoming a high or a
low risk that is included in the standard annuity equally to the unfairness of the
average priced standard annuity. The following property of an interior solution
can be shown:
Proposition 4 If an interior solution of (4) exists and the insured are risk-averse,
then there cannot be another interior solution.
Proof: This can be shown by examing the function
f(z∗) = z∗ · eL · [u(b∗)− u(bL)] + (1− z∗) · eH · [u(b∗)− u(bH)] (5)
where the expected utility of the the enhanced annuity is subtracted from the
expected utility of the standard annuity and b∗ is the aligned payout of the standard
annuity for the cut-off signal z∗. Proposition 3 implies that f(0) = 0 while it can
be deduced by applying Lemma 1 that f(1) < 0. For two or more interior solutions
(5) has to have at least one inflection point.10 Necessary condition for an inflection
point is that the second derivative of a function equals 0 at this point. Thus, the
first two derivatives of (5) have to be examined.
f ′(z∗) = u(b∗)·[eL−eH ]+u(bH)·eH−u(bL)·eL+u′(b∗)·(η·bL−η·bH)·[z∗·eL+(1−z∗)eH ]
10Note that an inflection point is not necessary for a single interior solution.
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Figure 3: The two cutoffs z+ = 0 and z∗ > 0.
and
f ′′(z∗) = 2·u′(bL)·[eL−eH ]·(η ·bL−η ·bH)+u′′(b∗)·(c·bL−c·bH)2 ·[z∗ ·eL+(1−z∗)eH ]
(6)
Setting (6) equal to 0 and rearranging it yields the following necessary condition
for an inflection point where rA(b) denotes the absolute risk aversion coefficient
for a premium b:
rA(b
∗) = − 2 · (e
H − eL)
η · (bL − bH)[z∗ · eL + (1− z∗) · eH ] . (7)
As eH − eL > 0 and bL − bH > 0 it follows that a necessary condition for a second
interior solution is that rA(b) < 0 which cannot be true for a risk averse individual.
Now, it remains to examine which solution will be reached in the case of the
existence of an interior solution. From a welfare economics point of view it holds
true that
Proposition 5 The interior cutoff Pareto-dominates the corner solution with z∗ =
0.
Proof: The proposition can be derived by a case differentiation. Firstly, assume
two possible cutoffs z+ = 0 and z∗ > 0. All individuals can be divided in two
different groups. The first group purchases the enhanced annuity with both cutoffs,
therefore the expected utility does not change with the cutoff for this group. The
second group switches from the enhanced annuity in case of cutoff z+ = 0 to the
standard annuity in case of cutoff z∗ > 0. Figure 3 demonstrates the distribution
of the two sets.
The proposition follows from the fact that the switchers increase their expected
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utility as the expected utility of the enhanced annuity does not change with a
variation of the cutoff. If they prefer the standard annuity at an interior solution,
they must be better off than with the enhanced annuity at z∗ = 0.
Accordingly, it follows that the interior cutoff will be reached if existing. In cases,
where no interior solutions exist, the corner solution where all individuals buy the
enhanced annuity is the only possible solution for an equilibrium. Concludingly,
it can be followed that enhanced annuities will definitely attract some purchasers.
Examining the steadiness of such a cutoff reveals that a standard annuity with
a lower payout cannot induce any purchaser to contract out as explained above.
The corner solution z∗ = 1 is not possible if there are different risk types. Any
other standard annuity with a payout bˆ such as z¯(z∗) · bL + (1 − z¯(z∗)) · bH <
bˆ < η · bL + (1− η) · bH will attract the former standard annuity buyers but does
not attract sufficient former enhanced annuity purchasers in order to generate a
non-negative expected profit.11 Therefore, the offered contracts will be purchased
and generate non-negative profits. In addition, there are no other contracts that
attract customers and generate non-negative profit. Correspondingly, the highest
interior solution will be a Nash-equilibrium.
Considering social welfare, it holds true that:
Proposition 6 From an utilitarian point of view, the additional offer of enhanced
annuities will induce a loss of social welfare.
Proof: Consider the utilitarian welfare function w =
∑
I E(v(b)) where I denotes
the set of individuals. With no enhanced annuities available, this term can be
reduced to
∑
I E(v(b)) =
∑
I v(b). When there are only enhanced annuities, the
welfare funtion changes to
w =
∑
I
[(1− zi) · v(bH) + zi · v(bL)] (8)
where zi denotes the signal of the i
th individual. By Jensen’s inequality and as
11This follows from the non-existence of a higher interior cutoff.
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v(b) is a concave function, it holds that
∑
I
[(1− zi) · v(bH) + zi · v(bL)] ≤
∑
I
v[(1− zi) · bH + zi · bL]. (9)
The right hand side of (9) must be less than
∑
I v(b) as v is a concave function
and it holds that
∑
I b =
∑
I [(1 − zi) · bH + zi · bL]. Thus, the exclusive offer of
enhanced annuities reduces social welfare from an utilitarian point of view.
Yet, the analysis of the market reaction to the introduction of enhanced annuities
has shown that there might also be an equilibrium where part of the insured
buy standard and some others enhanced annuities. Analogously, it holds that
such a solution is also welfare reducing compared to the only offer of standard
annuities. In this case, the utilitarian welfare function changes to
∑
Is v(b
∗) +∑
Ie(1 − zi) · v(bH) + zi · v(bL) where Is is the set of individuals that buy the
standard annuities and Ie the set of the enhanced annuity buyers. By Jensen’s
inequality, this expression is less or equal to
∑
Is v(b
∗) +
∑
Ie v((1− zi) · bH + zi ·
bL). In addition, it must still be less than the social welfare when there are only
standard annuities with the same arguments than before and because it hold that∑
Is b
∗ +
∑
Ie [(1− zi) · bH + zi · bH ] =
∑
Is b.
Intuitively, this holds true as the sum of the annuity payouts over the whole set of
annuity buyers is equal with both annuity types when annuities are priced fairly.
Yet, with the enhanced annuity the payouts vary more in total. Thus, roughly
speaking, the enhanced annuity contains more risk for the whole set of annuity
buyers. Nevertheless, this result cannot be solely held liable for regulating on the
annuity market as adverse selection was not modelled in this approach. Adverse
selection could induce some market participants with a reduced life expectancy
rather to accumulate capital privately as to invest in annuities. These individuals
could be regained to the annuity market when enhanced annuities are offered.
Thus, a overall welfare gain could be induced.
5 Conclusion
Enhanced annuities allow a more precise underwriting of risks in annuity insurance
and thus are designed to reduce informational asymmetries between insurer and
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insured. This paper has investigated the demand reactions on a market where
enhanced and standard annuities are offered simultaneously. A special focus was
laid on different types of superior knowledge of the insured. It was shown that in
the case of homogeneous knowledge, there were two possible results. If all insured
know about their future risk type, standard annuities will be driven out of the
market. On the opposite, only standard annuities will establish on the market, if
the insured do not have any superior knowledge. In the case of heterogeneous su-
perior knowledge, it was shown that either only enhanced annuities are purchased
or both products exist simultaneously. The second solution when existent must be
unique if the insured are risk averse and Pareto-dominates the case where only the
enhanced annuities are bought. Finally, social welfare was examined. It is shown
in the chosen setting that the introduction of enhanced annuities on a market with
only standard annuities before will always reduce social welfare from an utilitarian
point of view.
A limitations of the approach presented here is the fact that adverse selection was
not modelled. A result is that the introduction of enhanced annuities induces a
welfare loss due to the additional risk as no reduction of welfare losses due to ad-
verse selection are considered. Concerning further research, modelling insurance
demand in dependance of income and income risk will be interesting to investi-
gate as adverse selection effects could be shown by that. In that case, the welfare
implications are not clear as enhanced annuities, if pricing can be done properly
and accordingly to different risk types, addresses adverse selection problems. Yet,
they do not insure against the risk of becoming a high or low risk at the pension
entry age which reduces welfare.
A characteristic of enhanced annuitiues is that they offer a higher pension payment
in the case of a short life expectancy. Since a reduced life expectancy is mostly pos-
itively correlated with a impaired health, enhanced annuities also provide higher
payments in cases with higher expected health expenditures. This feature can
increase the attractiveness of enhanced annuities and may be modelled via state-
dependent utility function which might be productive to examine as well. Kifmann
(2008) has modelled the demand for annuities with state dependant utility func-
tions and shows that in this context, the offer of annuities depending on the risk
17
status of the insured can be welfare enhancing. Yet, he does not model the case
of heterogeneous knowledge of the insured.
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